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A theory of decision making is proposed that supplies an axiomatic basis for the
concept of “satisﬁcing” postulated by Herbert Simon. After a detailed review of
classical results that characterize several varieties of preference-maximizing choice
behavior, the axiomatization proceeds by weakening the inter-menu contraction
consistency condition involved in these characterizations. This exercise is shown to
be logically equivalent to dropping the usual cognitive assumption that the decision
maker fully perceives his preferences among available alternatives, and requiring
instead merely that his ability to perceive a given preference be weakly decreasing
with respect to the relative complexity (indicated by set inclusion) of the choice
problem at hand. A version of Simon’s hypothesis then emerges when the notion of
“perceived preference” is endowed with suﬃciently strong ordering properties, and
the axiomatization leads as well to a constraint on the form of satisﬁcing that the
decision maker may legitimately employ.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: D01, D71, D81.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many writers have felt that the assumption of rationality, in the sense of a one-dimensional
ordering of all possible alternatives, is absolutely necessary for economic theorizing.... There
seems to be no logical necessity for this viewpoint; we could just as well build up our economic
theory on other assumptions as to the structure of choice functions if the facts seemed to call
for it.
—— kenneth j. arrow (1951).
Half a century ago, Herbert Simon published the ﬁrst [32] of several early articles
challenging the models of decision making then and now dominant in economic analysis.
“[T]he task,” he wrote [p. 99], “is to replace the global rationality of economic man with
a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the
computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in
∗This paper contains material from Chapters 2–3 of the author’s PhD thesis [38].
1the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist.” In Simon’s view, cognitive
and information-processing constraints on the capabilities of economic agents, together
with the complexity of their environment (see [33]), render optimal decision making an
unattainable ideal. Rather than attempting a summary of the full argument — spread
over his sixty-odd years of work in the behavioral and cognitive sciences — we refer the
interested reader to [34] and [35], as well as to the three volumes [36] of Simon’s collected
writings on the subject.
Optimal decision making is ordinarily implemented in economic models by means of
the maximizing criterion
f(x) = maxf[A], (1)
which requires the chosen alternative x to achieve a utility (returned by the function f) no
less than the maximum obtainable from the menu A of available options. After oﬀering
a terse review of the basic tools of axiomatic choice theory, Section 2 establishes versions
of the classical results on preference-based choice (namely, Theorems 1–4) that provide a
behavioral foundation for this criterion. While the exposition of these results may have
some intrinsic value as a synthesis of widely scattered contributions, the primary purpose
of this section is to build up the classical theory in a manner adaptable to the construction
of the alternative theory to follow.
Having dismissed the idea that human decision makers exhibit “global rationality,”
Simon suggests that they in fact engage in “satisﬁcing”1 — deﬁned in [36, v. 3, p. 295]
as “choos[ing] an alternative that meets or exceeds speciﬁed criteria, but that is not
guaranteed to be either unique or in any sense the best.” Formulating this hypothesis in
utility space leads naturally to the satisﬁcing criterion
f(x) = θ(A), (2)
in which the threshold utility θ(A) for acceptability of an alternative can take on any
value less than or equal to the maximum in Equation 1. As this phrasing makes clear,
maximizing is then a special case of satisﬁcing, and it follows that any choice-theoretic
basis for the latter will be logically weaker than the classical basis for the former.
Our objective, therefore, is to develop an axiomatic foundation for satisﬁcing behavior
by diluting the conditions that underpin utility maximization. This task is carried out in
Section 3, where Simon’s cognitive and information-processing constraints are imagined
to prevent the decision maker from fully perceiving his (strict) preferences among the
available alternatives.2 Under the maintained “nestedness” assumption that a preference
perceived in choice problem B is also perceived in each problem A ⊂ B in which it is
relevant, a formal analysis closely paralleling the classical theory leads to a series of new
results (Theorems 5–7) that identify the restrictions on behavior implied by the imposition
of diﬀerent sets of ordering properties (such as acyclicity and transitivity) on the concept
of “perceived preference.” These results uncover a correspondence between failures of
perception and violations of the classical contraction consistency axiom, which states
that acceptability of an alternative in choice problem B together with its availability in
problem A ⊂ B should imply its acceptability in A. And when suﬃciently strong ordering
1Although Simon [36, v. 2, p. 415] identiﬁes this word as Scottish in origin, the O.E.D. ﬁnds its
earliest recorded use in the Swiss theologian Henry Bullinger’s [7] comment — presumably about the
Romans — That their founders were nourished by suckyng of a wolfe: so haue all that people wolues
mindes, neuer satisﬁsed with bloud, euer greedy of dominion and hungryng after riches....
2Extensive discussion of the rationale for this response to Simon’s critique can be found in Chapter 1
of [38].
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Figure 1: Choice behavior consistent with the satisﬁcing criterion. A menu is a subset
of the space [wxyz]; the binary relation P indicates strict preference; the function f
assigns utility values to alternatives; and the function θ assigns threshold utilities to
menus. Within the cells are displayed the mapping from menus to subsets of acceptable
alternatives (e.g., [wxy] 7−→ [xy]), the preferences perceived in particular choice problems
(e.g., xPw and yPw in problem [wxy]), and the values of θ (e.g., θ([wxy]) = 1).
properties are imposed on the preferences themselves (i.e., on the objects of perception
or non-perception) through the requirement of acyclicity of the base relation revealed by
binary choice data, a series of modiﬁed results (Theorems 8–10) are obtained of which
the last (Theorem 10) supplies the desired foundation for satisﬁcing.
The main features of our theory are illustrated by the example depicted in Figure 1.
Here one cell is allocated to each nontrivial choice problem drawn from the four-element
space [wxyz] (note the multiplicative notation for enumerated sets), and the upper entry
in each shows the subset of acceptable alternatives associated with the menu in ques-
tion. The alternatives deemed acceptable are those that are maximal with respect to the
perceived preferences shown in the middle entry in the cell (e.g., the perception of xPw
makes w unacceptable in problem [wxz]); or, alternatively, those with utility values no
smaller than the threshold shown in the lower entry (e.g., [v ∈ [wyz] : f(v) = 2] = [yz]).
The system of perceived preferences satisﬁes the nestedness assumption (e.g., the pref-
erence yPw perceived in problem [wxyz] is also perceived in problem [wxy] ⊂ [wxyz]).
And the decision maker’s behavior violates contraction consistency (e.g., alternative x is
deemed acceptable in problem [wxyz] but not in problem [xyz] ⊂ [wxyz]).
It is in permitting the latter type of violation that our theory departs from classical
models of decision making, and the last of the above parenthetical examples thus merits
closer scrutiny. As noted, alternative x is deemed unacceptable in problem [xyz], a fact
attributable to the preference zPx being perceived in this context. Classical assumptions
would then require that this preference be perceived, and hence that x be deemed un-
acceptable, in problem [wxyz] as well. But neither of these requirements follows from
our nestedness assumption (since [wxyz] 6⊂ [xyz]), one which therefore does not imply
contraction consistency of the decision maker’s behavior.
3The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the relationships among the three diﬀerent
types of constructs illustrated in Figure 1. Speciﬁcally, we determine the restrictions on
behavior that characterize maximization of a nested system of perceived preferences —
our model of decision making under cognitive and information-processing constraints — as
well as the further restrictions needed for consistency with the satisﬁcing criterion. Thus,
in addition to providing a choice-theoretic axiomatization of Herbert Simon’s hypothesis,
our analysis also oﬀers a cognitive interpretation of it; an answer to “the crucial question
of why people have the aspiration or satisfaction levels they have” (posed by Elster [9,
pp. 26–27] as a challenge to satisﬁcing theory).
This enterprise follows in the long tradition of axiomatic weakenings of the standard
economic model of decision making delineated by Savage [23, Chapters 2–5]; a tradition
exempliﬁed by the contributions of Aumann [4] and Bewley [6] removing the completeness
axiom (part of P1 in [23, p. 18]), by that of Machina and Schmeidler [19] abandoning
the Sure-Thing Principle (P2 in [23, p. 23]), and by those of Schmeidler [24] and Gilboa
and Schmeidler [11] eﬀectively doing away with various comparative probability axioms
(including P4 in [23, p. 31] and P4* in [19, p. 761]). Like Kreps [17], who considers agents
exhibiting a “preference for ﬂexibility,” we suppress the usual state-space formulation of
uncertainty and focus attention on one of Savage’s implicit assumptions; namely, that
the decision maker’s behavior is maximal with respect to a ﬁxed preference relation and
therefore satisﬁes contraction consistency.
A number of more recent papers also relate to one or another aspect of this essay.
Baigent and Gaertner [5] characterize a form of “polite” decision making that bears some
resemblance to satisﬁcing. Kalai et al. [16] allow for menu-dependence of the preference
relation (which can then incorporate “multiple rationales”), focusing on the question of
how much of this variation is needed to rationalize a given pattern of behavior. Gul
and Pesendorfer [12] consider a decision maker who, as a result of temptation rather
than of constraints on cognition, may suﬀer from the provision of extra alternatives.
Sheshinski [31] (following Mirrlees [20]) investigates the implications for public policy
of choice behavior that fails to reliably maximize the agent’s welfare. And Iyengar and
Lepper [14] (among others) examine the psychological eﬀects of decision complexity.
2. CLASSICAL CHOICE THEORY
2.1. Choice functions
At a high level of abstraction, axiomatic choice theory expresses the decision making
environment as a pair hX,Ai, where X denotes an arbitrary nonempty set and A a
collection of subsets of X. In this choice space formulation, a set A ∈ A is a menu of
mutually-exclusive alternatives, A itself a list of the choice problems (menus) of interest,
and X a full catalog of the alternatives potentially available. The mathematical primitive
of the theory is then a choice function C : A → 2X associating with each A ∈ A a so-
called choice set C(A) properly interpreted as the set of alternatives whose selection from
this menu cannot be ruled out by the theorist.
Under the suggested interpretation, two conditions on C are unobjectionable enough
to be considered part of the deﬁnition of a choice function.
Postulate 1 (Availability) C(A) ⊂ A.
Postulate 2 (Decisiveness) A 6= ∅ =⇒ |C(A)| = 1.
4A third condition has rather more content, requiring the speciﬁcation of a choice set for
each subset of the catalog X, but will also be taken to hold tacitly throughout.
Postulate 3 (Universality) A = 2X.3
2.2. Binary relations and orderings
We next review some elementary deﬁnitions and facts about binary relations, which play
a central role in axiomatic choice theory.
A (binary) relation on the set X is a subset of X × X. For example, the equality
relation is E = [hx,yi : x = y]. We write xRy for hx,yi ∈ R, the statement “x bears
the relation R to y.” Given a relation R, we can deﬁne its converse R0 = [hx,yi : yRx],
complement ¯ R = [hx,yi : ¬(xRy)], and symmetric residue R◦ = ¯ R ∩ ¯ R0. Given a second
relation Q, the composition of Q with R is QR = [hx,zi : (∃y) xQy & yRz]. The nth
power of R is then deﬁned inductively via Rn = RRn−1 (with R1 = R), and the associated
ancestral relation is R∗ =
S∞
n=1 Rn.
Table 1 lists ten properties that a binary relation may or may not exhibit, while
Table 2 records certain (easily veriﬁable) logical relationships among them. Inspection
of the second table reveals two families of properties, each with a hierarchical structure.
From weakest to strongest, irreﬂexivity, asymmetry, and acyclicity are antireﬂexivity
properties; each forbidding elements of X from standing in some relation (R, R2, and R∗,
respectively) to themselves. And similarly, residual, cross, and negative transitivity are
(for want of a better name) extratransitivity properties; each requiring a product of two
relations to be included in a third.
Table 3 lists ﬁve classes of binary relations together with their deﬁning properties.
In light of the implications shown in Table 2, we see that the four classes of orderings
listed also have a hierarchical relationship: A proto order is a relation exhibiting the
antireﬂexivity properties, a partial order is a proto order exhibiting transitivity, a weak
order is a partial order exhibiting the extratransitivity properties, and a linear order is a
weak order exhibiting weak connectedness. (The class of equivalences is of course logically
independent of these four classes of orderings.)
2.3. Revealed preference relations
Let us write P for the binary relation on X that encodes our decision maker’s strict
preferences among the alternatives, so that the preference-maximal members of a given
menu A are contained in the set P↑(A) =

x ∈ A : (∀y ∈ A) y¯ Px

. The hypothesis that
the chosen alternative will be preference maximal then implies that C(A) ⊂ P↑(A), and
when this inclusion holds for each A ∈ A we shall write C ⊂ P↑ and say that P supplies
an upper bound for the choice function. In the absence of any further hypotheses we have
also the analogous lower bound inclusions, indicated by P↑⊂ C, and hence the equality
C = P↑. When the latter holds we shall say that P generates the choice function.
3Herzberger [13, p. 192] dubs this the property of “full extension,” and suggests that any theory
incompatible with it is inherently deﬁcient.
[E]ssentially non-extended choice functions must be ones that satisfy certain rationality con-
ditions solely by grace of “gaps” at critical points in their domain. Holding the rationality
conditions constant, these are gaps that cannot be ﬁlled. ...[A] theory of rationality would
be better to safeguard itself against such gerrymandered satisfaction of its requirements.
Arrow [2] and Sen [27] have also defended Universality in the archetypical setting of consumer demand
theory.
5reﬂexivity: E ⊂ R transitivity: R2 ⊂ R
irreﬂexivity: R ⊂ ¯ E residual transitivity: (R◦)2 ⊂ R◦
symmetry: R ⊂ R0 cross transitivity: RR◦ ∪ R◦R ⊂ R
asymmetry: R2 ⊂ ¯ E negative transitivity: ¯ R2 ⊂ ¯ R
acyclicity: R∗ ⊂ ¯ E weak connectedness: R◦ ⊂ E
Table 1: Properties of binary relations. Here R denotes an arbitrary relation, R0 its
converse, ¯ R its complement, R◦ its symmetric residue, R∗ the associated ancestral relation,
and E the equality relation.




acyclicity, weak connectedness transitivity
asymmetry, negative transitivity transitivity
cross transitivity residual transitivity
irreﬂexivity, weak connectedness residual transitivity
negative transitivity cross transitivity
transitivity, residual transitivity negative transitivity
Table 2: Logical relationships among properties. A relation exhibits the antecedent
properties only if it also exhibits the consequent property.
class of relations deﬁning properties
proto orders acyclicity
partial orders irreﬂexivity, transitivity
weak orders asymmetry, negative transitivity
linear orders acyclicity, weak connectedness
equivalences reﬂexivity, symmetry, transitivity
Table 3: Classes of binary relations. A relation belongs to a class if and only if it exhibits
the indicated properties.
6While this construction illustrates how a hypothesized preference relation can be used
to place restrictions on the choice function, it is also possible to take this function as given
and to construct from it notions of “revealed” preference. Of the many such notions that
have been proposed,4 we shall require only a few.
Deﬁnition 1 The global relation Pg is deﬁned by xPgy if and only if for each menu A
with x ∈ A we have y / ∈ C(A). The base relation Pb is deﬁned by xPby if and only if
y / ∈ C([xy]). The separation relation Ps is deﬁned by xPsy if and only if there exists
a menu A such that both x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A \ C(A).
Proposition 1 Pg ⊂ Pb ⊂ Ps. Pg is acyclic. Pb is asymmetric. Ps is irreﬂexive.
An alternative x bears the global relation to a second alternative y when we know that
y will be rejected in any choice problem in which x is available, while x bears the base
relation to y when we know simply that y will be rejected in a pairwise choice between
the two. Weaker still, x bears the separation relation to y when there exists some choice
problem (not necessarily the pairwise choice) from which we can rule out y but not x.
The base relation has a certain salience as an indicator of preference, since the datum
xPby indicates that y will be rejected and hence x chosen when no other alternatives
are present to complicate matters. Moreover, the base relation alone would appear to
be suﬃcient for our purposes in this section in light of Arrow’s [3, p. 16] observation
that within the classical theory “the choice in any environment can be determined by
a knowledge of the choices in two-element environments.” But in fact the base and
global relations will turn out to coincide within the classical theory, and it will facilitate
comparison with later results if we now focus attention on Pg.
The following two conditions demarcate the class of choice functions generated by
their respective global relations.
Condition 1 (Global Upper Bound) C ⊂ Pg↑.
Condition 2 (Global Lower Bound) Pg↑⊂ C.
By the deﬁnition of Pg, the ﬁrst of these is a tautology that places no restrictions on C.
Proposition 2 Global Upper Bound holds for any choice function.
Note also that Pg includes any other binary relation that supplies an upper bound for C.
Proposition 3 If C ⊂ R↑, then R ⊂ Pg.
This implies that if a relation R generates the choice function, then Pg↑⊂ R↑= C ⊂ Pg↑
and hence Pg does as well.
Proposition 4 A choice function is generated by a relation if and only if it is generated
by Pg.
And ﬁnally, combining Propositions 2 and 4 shows that Global Lower Bound is necessary
and suﬃcient for the choice function to be consistent with the preference maximization
hypothesis (a property known as [13, p. 203] “binariness” or [26, p. 309] “normality”
of C).
Corollary 1 A choice function is generated by a relation if and only if it satisﬁes Global
Lower Bound.
4See, for example, the bestiary of revealed preference relations discussed in Herzberger [13].
72.4. Proto preference orders
In the present context, the antireﬂexivity properties are undoubtedly the most appealing
among those listed in Table 1. Indeed, for a relation encoding preference assessments,
a violation of irreﬂexivity can only be described as nonsensical, one of asymmetry as
contradictory, and one of acyclicity as [13, p. 195] “extremely pathological.” These asser-
tions are supported by the following result, which shows that the choice function cannot
be consistent with the preference maximization hypothesis unless the maximized relation
exhibits all three of the antireﬂexivity properties.
Proposition 5 Any relation that supplies an upper bound for C is a proto order.5
This fact enables us to strengthen slightly the characterization in Corollary 1.
Proposition 6 A choice function is generated by a proto order if and only if it satisﬁes
Global Lower Bound.
Global Lower Bound can be cast in a more familiar form as the conjunction of two
conditions with long histories in axiomatic choice theory.
Condition 3 (Contraction) A ⊂ B =⇒ C(B) ∩ A ⊂ C(A).6
Condition 4 (Weak Expansion)
T
k C(Ak) ⊂ C (
S
k Ak).7
Proposition 7 Contraction and Weak Expansion together are logically equivalent to
Global Lower Bound.
The ﬁrst of these conditions requires that if an alternative x is in the choice set associated
with a particular menu (i.e., B), then it must also be in the choice sets associated with
a collection of “contracted” menus (i.e., each A satisfying x ∈ A ⊂ B). Conversely,
the second condition requires that if x is in the choice sets associated with a collection
of menus (i.e., Ak for each k in some index set), then it must also be in the choice set
associated with a particular “expanded” menu (i.e.,
S
k Ak). Since Global Lower Bound
amounts to a combination of these requirements, Proposition 6 can be rephrased as a
characterization of the proto order maximization hypothesis in terms of contraction and
expansion consistency.
Theorem 1 A choice function is generated by a proto order if and only if it satisﬁes
Contraction and Weak Expansion.8
5Cf. Jamison and Lau’s [15, p. 903] Theorem 1.
6This is Sen’s [25, p. 384] Property α, or [29, p. 500] “basic contraction consistency.” The condition
seems ﬁrst to have appeared as Chernoﬀ’s [8, p. 429] Postulate 4, although Nash [21, p. 159] employs a
precursor.
7This is Sen’s [26, p. 314] Property γ, or [29, p. 500] “basic expansion consistency.”
8This is Sen’s [26, p. 314] T.9. Incidentally, the theorem answers a question posed by Kreps [18,
p. 15].
82.5. Partial preference orders
If the suitability of the antireﬂexivity properties is diﬃcult to dispute, transitivity at
least oﬀers “impressive credentials” [13, p. 194] as a criterion of consistency for preference
assessments; and imposing this property in conjunction with the maximization hypothesis
entails a further restriction on the choice function.9
Condition 5 (Adjunct Expansion) C(B) ⊂ A ⊂ B =⇒ C(A) ⊂ C(B).
This condition dictates that when a menu expands to include new options, the incumbent
members of the choice set must retain this membership as long as no new alternative
attains it.
Lemma 1 Adjunct Expansion implies that Pg is a partial order. A choice function is
generated by a partial order only if it satisﬁes Adjunct Expansion.
Theorem 2 A choice function is generated by a partial order if and only if it satisﬁes
Contraction, Weak Expansion, and Adjunct Expansion.10
2.6. Weak preference orders
Once transitivity is admitted as a consistency criterion, Table 2 shows that to admit any
one of the extratransitivity properties is to admit them all. In the present context, these
new properties lack the immediate intuitive appeal of those previously considered, and
to understand their interpretation it is useful to consider for a moment the symmetric
residue P◦ = ¯ P ∩ ¯ P0 of the decision maker’s preference relation P. Now in general, one
alternative bearing P◦ to a second need mean nothing more than that neither alternative
is deﬁnitely preferred to the other. When the extratransitivity properties are imposed
on P, however, its symmetric residue inherits the properties of an equivalence — those
same properties that an expression of positive indiﬀerence would be expected to satisfy.
And since in this case the relations P, P0, and P◦ partition the space of alternative-pairs,
admitting the extratransitivity properties amounts to asserting that our decision maker
should be able, given any two alternatives, to aﬃrm either a deﬁnite preference for one
over the other or his indiﬀerence between them.
This further strengthening of the preference maximization hypothesis entails a restric-
tion on the choice function that subsumes both of the expansion consistency conditions
thus far introduced.
Condition 6 (Strong Expansion) A ⊂ B & C(B) ∩ A 6= ∅ =⇒ C(A) ⊂ C(B).11
Proposition 8 Strong Expansion implies both Weak Expansion and Adjunct Expansion.
This condition insists that when a menu expands, the incumbent members of the choice
set must retain this membership as long as any incumbent alternative attains it.
Lemma 2 Strong Expansion implies that Pg is a weak order. A choice function is gen-
erated by a weak order only if it satisﬁes Strong Expansion.
9Anand [1] discusses philosophical aspects of transitivity.
10Cf. Sen’s [26, p. 315] T.10 and Jamison and Lau’s [15, p. 904] Theorem 2.
11This is Sen’s [28, p. 66] Property β(+).
9Theorem 3 A choice function is generated by a weak order if and only if it satisﬁes
Contraction and Strong Expansion.12
Incidentally, the conditions that appear in Theorem 3 can be joined together to form
the better-known Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference.
Condition 7 (Weak Axiom) Ps ⊂ Pg.13
Proposition 9 Contraction and Strong Expansion together are logically equivalent to the
Weak Axiom.
Note also, recalling Proposition 1, that Pg = Pb = Ps when the Weak Axiom holds.
2.7. Linear preference orders
Because of its close connection to the machinery of utility maximization (see Section 2.8),
the assumption that weak preference orders guide human choice behavior is widespread
in economic analysis. But occasionally it is useful to adopt the stronger assumption that
the guiding relation is a linear order, thereby requiring that the decision maker be able
to aﬃrm a deﬁnite preference between any two distinct alternatives. The incremental
restriction on the choice function that captures this new requirement — a strengthening
of the Decisiveness postulate — demands that each (nonempty) choice set contain a single
element.
Condition 8 (Univalence) A 6= ∅ =⇒ |C(A)| = 1.14
While this is, per se, neither a contraction nor an expansion consistency axiom, when
paired with a condition of either type it can serve in the complementary capacity.
Proposition 10 Contraction and Strong Expansion are logically equivalent in the pres-
ence of Univalence.
Lemma 3 Strong Expansion and Univalence jointly imply that Pg is a linear order. A
choice function is generated by a linear order only if it satisﬁes Univalence.
Theorem 4 A choice function is generated by a linear order if and only if it satisﬁes
Strong Expansion and Univalence.
Figure 2 illustrates the principal logical implications among the (non-tautological)
conditions on the choice function introduced in this paper. The reader may ﬁnd it useful
at this point to review Theorems 1–4 and to locate in the ﬁgure the set of conditions that
hold in each instance.
12Cf. Sen’s [25, p. 385] Corollary 1.
13This is Arrow’s [2, p. 123] C5 and Sen’s [26, p. 309] Weak Congruence Axiom. A version of the
condition ﬁrst appeared as Samuelson’s [22, p. 65] Postulate III.
























Figure 2: Logical implications among (non-tautological) conditions on the choice function.
A condition is indicated by its initials and an implication by a directed edge. Intersecting
edges indicate a joint hypothesis.
112.8. Utility representations
An important historical and practical concern of economic theory has been assessing the
plausibility of and the axiomatic basis for the utility-maximization model of decision
making. This model posits the existence of a function f : X → < that encodes the
preference relation in the sense that xPy if and only if f(x) > f(y), and an obvious
consequence of this encoding is that the maximization operators (applied to menus)
associated with P and f coincide. If, moreover, the relation P generates the choice
function, then for each nonempty menu A we have
C(A) = [x ∈ A : f(x) = maxf[A]], (3)
which is to say that the members of a choice set are those available alternatives that meet
the maximizing criterion. When this is so, we shall say that the function f provides a
utility representation of the choice function, and we shall call the representation injective
when f is one-to-one.
Since a preference relation that can be encoded in a function taking real values will
inherit from the relation > on < the properties of a weak order, the utility-maximization
model of decision making clearly falls under the purview of Theorem 3 above. But well-
known counterexamples show that not every weak order can be thus encoded, with an
additional order-topological property being needed to ensure encodability.15 So as to
avoid becoming preoccupied with this issue — one that is irrelevant to the main point
of this essay — we provide here an exact characterization of the class of choice functions
admitting utility representations only for the very simple case of a ﬁnite choice space
(i.e., a ﬁnite catalog X).
Proposition 11 A choice function on a ﬁnite choice space admits a utility representation
(resp., an injective utility representation) if and only if it satisﬁes Contraction and Strong
Expansion (resp., Strong Expansion and Univalence).
3. CHOICE THEORY WITHOUT CONTRACTION CONSISTENCY
3.1. Relation systems and nestedness
If our decision maker cannot be relied upon to perceive all of his preferences, then we
shall require a model of his cognitive capabilities more elaborate than that embodied
in the relation P. In this case, our being told of the existence of a preference for one
alternative over another does not enable us to conclude that the second alternative will
never be chosen when the ﬁrst is available, since this preference might be imperceptible
in the context of some particularly complex choice problem in which it is relevant. But
if the perceptibility as well as the existence of preferences is to be called into question,
then we can certainly devise a formalism that describes the former in the same way that
a binary relation describes the latter. Given a menu A, let us write PA for the relation
on A that encodes the preferences that the decision maker perceives when faced with
this choice problem. Now, allowing the menu to vary, we collect the associated perceived
preference relations in a vector P = hPAiA∈A to be referred to as the preference system.
The perceived-preference-maximal members of the menu A are then contained in the set
P↑(A) =

x ∈ A : (∀y ∈ A) y¯ PAx

, and when C ⊂ P↑ (resp., P↑⊂ C) — adopting a
notation analogous to that in Section 2.3 — we shall say that P supplies an upper bound
15Here Fishburn [10, p. 27] is a valuable reference for both counterexamples and positive results.
12(resp., a lower bound) for the choice function. When C = P ↑ , we shall of course say
that P generates the choice function.
Let us call an arbitrary vector R of relations indexed by A a relation system. The




A∈A RA ⊂ X × X of its component relations. A
relation system will be said to exhibit a property normally ascribed to a binary relation
(e.g., reﬂexivity) when each of its component relations exhibits the property, and we
can form derived relation systems (e.g., the system of converse relations) in the obvious
fashion. Furthermore, we shall refer to a relation system whose components each belong
to a particular class of relations by appending the name of the class (e.g., a system of
proto orders).
It will not have escaped the reader that every choice function is generated by a relation
system, and so the hypothesis that P generates C excludes no logical possibilities. There
is, however, a natural intercomponent restriction on the generating system that does
constrain the choice function, and that interacts with various sets of intracomponent (i.e.,
ordering) restrictions in a manner that will soon become apparent. By way of introducing
this restriction, let us suppose that when facing the menu B our decision maker perceives
a preference for one alternative over another. Then, when confronted with a diﬀerent
menu A that contains the two alternatives related by the preference and that is in some
sense no more complex than B, we might reasonably expect the decision maker again
to perceive this relationship on the grounds that only an increase in the complexity of
the problem could have rendered it imperceptible. Although we have not speciﬁed what
it means for one choice problem to be more or less complex than another, we can treat
the set inclusion relation as being demonstrative of weak comparative complexity under
the modest assumption that adding new alternatives to a problem cannot make it any
simpler. We thus deﬁne a relation system R to be nested if for any x,y ∈ A ⊂ B we have
xRBy only if xRAy (cf. Anand [1, p. 339]), thereby formalizing what we shall take to be
a basic property of our decision maker’s preference system.16
3.2. The local relation system
In order to characterize choice behavior governed by preference systems, we shall require
a suitable indicator of perceived preference assembled (like the relations in Section 2.3)
from choice function data. Constructing such an indicator poses no small diﬃculty, since
it will consist not of a single binary relation, but rather of an entire vector of relations
indexed by A. Nevertheless, we can deﬁne an appropriate relation system by exploiting
the presumed nestedness of P.
Deﬁnition 2 The local relation system Pl is deﬁned by xPl
By if and only if x,y ∈ B




Pl = Pb. Pl is nested and acyclic.
16As always with blanket statements in abstract settings, one can attempt to concoct counterexamples.
A choice, say, between execution by ﬁring squad or by electrocution might well be more complex, in the
sense that it is more diﬃcult to reach a decision, than a choice among these two modes of execution and
dinner with the Queen at Buckingham Palace. Note, however, that this scenario (envisioned by Yossi
Feinberg) will not violate the nestedness restriction unless, for example, a preference for electrocution
over the ﬁring squad is perceived when dinner is available but not when it isn’t.
For a case in which nestedness clearly is violated, see Sen’s [30, p. 753] “Tea or heroin?” example
(pointed out by Nageeb Ali), which illustrates the idea that a menu can have “epistemic importance.”
13Since an alternative x bears the relation Pl
B to a second alternative y whenever y will
be rejected in any choice problem included in B and containing x, we can view Pl
B as a
global relation that searches only the subsets of its subscript.
The role of Pl in this section will mirror that of Pg in Section 2, and therefore our
ﬁrst task is to identify the class of choice functions generated by their respective local
relation systems.
Condition 9 (Local Upper Bound) C ⊂ Pl↑.
Condition 10 (Local Lower Bound) Pl↑⊂ C.
Like its analog in the classical theory, the ﬁrst of these two conditions is a tautology.
Proposition 13 Local Upper Bound holds for any choice function.
It is also true that Pl includes componentwise any other nested relation system that
supplies an upper bound for the choice function — a formal expression of the intuitive
notion that the local relation system “generously” declares a perceived preference to exist
whenever no contradictory evidence is forthcoming.
Proposition 14 If R is nested and C ⊂ R↑, then for each menu A we have RA ⊂ Pl
A.
This implies that if a nested relation system R generates C, then Pl↑⊂ R↑= C ⊂ Pl↑
and hence Pl does as well.
Proposition 15 A choice function is generated by a nested relation system if and only
if it is generated by Pl.
And ﬁnally, combining Propositions 13 and 15 shows that Local Lower Bound is necessary
and suﬃcient for the choice function to arise from maximization of a nested preference
system.
Corollary 2 A choice function is generated by a nested relation system if and only if it
satisﬁes Local Lower Bound.
3.3. Preference systems of proto orders
Continuing to proceed in parallel with the classical theory, we now strengthen Corollary 2
by establishing the following analogs to Propositions 5 and 6.
Proposition 16 Any nested relation system that supplies an upper bound for C is a
system of proto orders.
Proposition 17 A choice function is generated by a nested system of proto orders if and
only if it satisﬁes Local Lower Bound.
Despite its arcane appearance, the condition used in this characterization is one that we
have already encountered in a diﬀerent form.
Proposition 18 Local Lower Bound is logically equivalent to Weak Expansion.
14Thus we obtain an alternative characterization that excises contraction consistency from
Theorem 1.
Theorem 5 A choice function is generated by a nested system of proto orders if and
only if it satisﬁes Weak Expansion.
It is worth noting that Theorem 5 links Weak Expansion to the nestedness requirement
that perceived preferences be preserved under contraction of the menu of alternatives.
Similarly, Contraction can be linked to the requirement that perceived preferences be
preserved under expansion of the menu. Here the terminological inversion results from
the inverse relationship between preference and choice: A (perceived) preference for one
alternative over another is a reason not to choose the second alternative — but not in
itself a reason to choose the ﬁrst.
3.4. Preference systems of partial orders
The credentials of transitivity as a consistency criterion are surely no less impressive
in the case of perceived preferences than they are in the case of ordinary preference
assessments. Once again, imposing this property further constrains the choice function;
in fact, it entails precisely the same incremental restriction on C as before.
Lemma 4 Adjunct Expansion implies that Pl is a system of partial orders. A choice
function is generated by a nested system of partial orders only if it satisﬁes Adjunct
Expansion.
Theorem 6 A choice function is generated by a nested system of partial orders if and
only if it satisﬁes Weak Expansion and Adjunct Expansion.
When Weak Expansion is supplemented with Adjunct Expansion, the consequences
for the latent preference system are actually somewhat subtle. As we have seen, Weak
Expansion alone suﬃces to make Pl a nested system of proto orders that generates the
choice function, and the astute reader will have observed that forming the transitive
closure (Pl)∗ then creates a system of partial orders that generates C as well. This
artiﬁce fails to invalidate Theorem 6, however, because forming the system of ancestral
relations does not in general preserve nestedness. The latter point should make it clear
that our intercomponent nestedness and intracomponent ordering assumptions on P do
not operate independently: On the contrary, without nestedness only very strong (linear)
ordering assumptions place any restriction whatsoever on the choice function.
3.5. Preference systems of weak orders
Admitting the extratransitivity properties as consistency criteria for perceived preferences
also entails the same incremental restriction on the choice function as in the classical
theory.
Lemma 5 Strong Expansion implies that Pl is a system of weak orders. A choice func-
tion is generated by a nested system of weak orders only if it satisﬁes Strong Expansion.
Theorem 7 A choice function is generated by a nested system of weak orders if and only
if it satisﬁes Strong Expansion.
15While in the case of the preference relation P we could parse the extratransitivity
properties in terms of its symmetric residue P◦ taking on the characteristics of an indif-
ference relation (see Section 2.6), in the case of the preference system P these properties
are not so readily interpretable. We can of course construct the system P◦ of symmetric
residues, but we cannot then interpret an expression of the form xP◦
Ay as an assertion of
“perceived indiﬀerence” since it does not preclude a contradictory perceived preference
assessment of the form xPBy (except, under nestedness, when A ⊂ B). And conversely,
without the indiﬀerence interpretation of P◦ we lack an obvious justiﬁcation for imposing
the extratransitivity properties on P.17
A more illuminating perspective on the characterization in Theorem 7 focuses instead
on the negative transitivity of the preference system; the requirement, given x,z ∈ A such
that xPAz, that each y ∈ A satisfy either xPAy or yPAz. This can be phrased as a demand
that the decision maker be able to place any available alternative somewhere on the scale
of value created by a particular perceived preference — to judge it either worse than the
better alternative or better than the worse alternative. A nested preference system of
weak orders is therefore the structure appropriate to a decision maker who can always
fully resolve his opinions at some level of precision, though his ability to discriminate
among alternatives may diminish as the menu expands on which they appear.
3.6. Preference systems of linear orders
Imposing weak connectedness on P once more leads to a familiar restriction on the choice
function.
Lemma 6 Strong Expansion and Univalence jointly imply that Pl is a system of linear
orders. A choice function is generated by a system of linear orders only if it satisﬁes
Univalence.
But according to Theorem 4, any choice function satisfying both Strong Expansion and
Univalence is generated simply by a linear order, and this implication brings us to the
following conclusion.
Proposition 19 A choice function is generated by a nested system of linear orders if
and only if it is generated by a linear order.
The logic of this result is most easily understood in the light of our commentary on
Theorem 7 above. As we have seen, a decision maker possessing a preference system of
weak orders is one who can always fully resolve his opinions, though his discriminatory
capabilities may depend upon the menu he faces. But if the components of P are linear
orders then these capabilities cannot in fact depend upon the menu, since a weakly
connected relation necessarily discriminates between any two distinct alternatives. The
requirement of nestedness then ensures that the components are all drawn from a single
linear order on X, and the latter will be certain to generate C whenever P does so.
17As Herzberger [13, p. 201] would have it, “Indiﬀerence relations representing preferential matching
[i.e., indiﬀerence] ought to be held subject to quite diﬀerent rationality conditions from those appropriate
to amalgamated mutual nonpreference [i.e., symmetric residue] relations,” and no doubt the same can
be said of relations for which we are driven to the unfortunate locution “amalgamated mutual absence
of perceived preference.”
163.7. Rehabilitating the preference relation
While Theorems 5–7 succeed in characterizing choice behavior governed by preference
systems that exhibit various sets of ordering properties, these results place no restrictions
on the preference assessments that the decision maker either does or does not perceive.
This is because, as our analysis has shown, the various sets of expansion consistency con-
ditions actually impose the corresponding ordering properties on the revealed preference
system Pl, and it is only in the classical world of full perception (i.e., under Contraction)
that these properties are inherited by the revealed preference relation Pg. Yet we may
wish to insist that the decision maker’s preference assessments satisfy certain consistency
criteria quite apart from any question of cognition, since the assumptions we have made
in this section about his powers of perception (i.e., about P) are logically distinguishable
from the assumptions made in Section 2 about the objects of perception (i.e., about P).
If we call a relation Q a foundation for the relation system R whenever
S
R ⊂ Q, then
we can reimpose a particular ordering property on P simply by requiring P to admit a
foundation exhibiting this property. (Here there is of course an implicit assumption that S
P ⊂ P; i.e., that perceived preferences are in fact preferences.) This task is simpliﬁed
by the following result, which implies that the projection of each nested relation system
that generates C is the familiar base relation.
Proposition 20 If R is nested and for each x,y ∈ X we have C([xy]) = R↑([xy]), then S
R = Pb.
At a minimum, we shall want to reimpose the antireﬂexivity properties on the prefer-
ence relation. If a relation system R is nested, generates the choice function, and admits
a proto order foundation Q; then we have that Pb =
S
R ⊂ Q (by Proposition 20), that
(Pb)∗ ⊂ Q∗ ⊂ ¯ E, and hence that the following acyclicity condition is satisﬁed.
Condition 11 (Base Acyclicity) (Pb)∗ ⊂ ¯ E.
Proposition 21 Contraction implies Base Acyclicity.
On the other hand, if the condition holds then the relation (Pb)∗ is a partial order and
by Szpilrajn’s [37] Embedding Theorem can be strengthened to a linear order Q. We
then have
S
Pl = Pb ⊂ (Pb)∗ ⊂ Q (using Proposition 12), which is to say that Q is a
foundation for Pl.
Lemma 7 Base Acyclicity implies that Pl admits a linear order foundation. A choice
function is generated by a nested relation system that admits a proto order foundation
only if it satisﬁes Base Acyclicity.
Lemma 7 demonstrates that we can use Base Acyclicity to reimpose ordering proper-
ties on our decision maker’s preference relation. But since this condition is both necessary
for the preference system to admit a proto order foundation and suﬃcient for it to admit a
linear order foundation, preference relations belonging to the diﬀerent classes of orderings
cannot be distinguished (absent full perception) on the basis of choice function data. In
other words, once we have insisted that the preference relation exhibit the antireﬂexivity
properties, any stronger ordering properties will have no empirical content.
We are now in a position to provide modiﬁcations of Theorems 5–7 that rehabilitate
the preference relation in the sense described above.
17Contraction — Base Acyclicity
a nested a nested system of proto orders
Weak Expansion a proto order system of that admits a linear
proto orders order foundation
Weak Expansion a nested a nested system of partial orders
and Adjunct a partial order system of that admits a linear
Expansion partial orders order foundation
a nested a nested system of weak orders
Strong Expansion a weak order system of that admits a linear
weak orders order foundation
Strong
Expansion a linear order
and Univalence
Table 4: Summary of Theorems 1–10. A choice function is generated by the indicated
structure if and only if it satisﬁes the marginal conditions. Note that both Contraction
and Base Acyclicity are implied by the conjunction of Strong Expansion and Univalence.
Theorem 8 A choice function is generated by a nested system of proto orders that admits
a linear order foundation if and only if it satisﬁes Weak Expansion and Base Acyclicity.
Theorem 9 A choice function is generated by a nested system of partial orders that
admits a linear order foundation if and only if it satisﬁes Weak Expansion, Adjunct
Expansion, and Base Acyclicity.
Theorem 10 A choice function is generated by a nested system of weak orders that
admits a linear order foundation if and only if it satisﬁes Strong Expansion and Base
Acyclicity.
Note that although these results are phrased in terms of linear order foundations for the
generating systems, in each case the listed conditions would remain necessary if we were
to require only a foundation belonging to one of the weaker classes of orderings.
Theorems 1–10, our main choice-theoretic characterization results, are summarized in
Table 4. Here the row and column headings indicate diﬀerent sets of conditions on C,
while the cells contain the structures thereby characterized. Juxtaposition of the ﬁrst and
second columns of cells reveals the parallel features of choice theory with and without
contraction consistency: Deleting Contraction from the set of conditions identiﬁed in
a classical characterization corresponds to relaxing the assumption that the preference
relation is fully perceived and assuming merely that the preference system is nested, while
at the same time transferring any ordering properties from the one (P) to the other (P).
Similarly, juxtaposition of the second and third columns of cells shows that restoring
Base Acyclicity (an implication of Contraction) to a set of conditions then corresponds
to reimposing the linear ordering properties on the preference relation. Note that any
attempt to delete Contraction from or to restore Base Acyclicity to the set of conditions
identiﬁed in Theorem 4 will have no eﬀect, since both of these conditions are implied by
the conjunction of Strong Expansion and Univalence.
Examples of choice functions illustrating Theorems 1–10 are furnished in Table 5.
18menu: [wx] [wy] [wz] [xy] [xz] [yz] [wxy] [wxz] [wyz] [xyz] [wxyz]
1. [w] [wy] [wz] [x] [xz] [y] [w] [wz] [wy] [x] [w]
satisﬁes GLB, C, WE/LLB, BA; violates AE, SE, WA, U, SA
2. [w] [wy] [wz] [xy] [xz] [y] [wy] [wz] [wy] [xy] [wy]
satisﬁes GLB, C, WE/LLB, AE, BA; violates SE, WA, U, SA
3. [wx] [w] [w] [x] [x] [yz] [wx] [wx] [w] [x] [wx]
satisﬁes GLB, C, WE/LLB, AE, SE, WA, BA, SA; violates U
4. [w] [w] [w] [x] [x] [y] [w] [w] [w] [x] [w]
satisﬁes GLB, C, WE/LLB, AE, SE, WA, U, BA, SA
5. [w] [y] [wz] [x] [z] [y] [x] [wxz] [yz] [y] [xyz]
satisﬁes WE/LLB; violates GLB, C, AE, SE, WA, U, BA, SA
6. [w] [y] [w] [x] [x] [yz] [xy] [w] [yz] [x] [xy]
satisﬁes WE/LLB, AE; violates GLB, C, SE, WA, U, BA, SA
7. [x] [y] [z] [x] [z] [y] [xy] [xz] [yz] [xyz] [xyz]
satisﬁes WE/LLB, AE, SE; violates GLB, C, WA, U, BA, SA
8. [w] [y] [wz] [xy] [z] [y] [xy] [wxz] [yz] [y] [xyz]
satisﬁes WE/LLB, BA; violates GLB, C, AE, SE, WA, U, SA
9. [x] [y] [z] [x] [x] [y] [xy] [wx] [yz] [xy] [xy]
satisﬁes WE/LLB, AE, BA; violates GLB, C, SE, WA, U, SA
10. [x] [y] [z] [x] [xz] [y] [xy] [xz] [yz] [xyz] [xyz]
satisﬁes WE/LLB, AE, SE, BA, SA; violates GLB, C, WA, U
Table 5: Examples illustrating Theorems 1–10. Choice functions on the four-element
space X = [wxyz] appear as rows numbered according to the relevant theorem. Cells
contain the choice sets associated with the menus that serve as the corresponding column
headings. Below each row of data the conditions depicted in Figure 2 are registered as
being either satisﬁed or violated by the choice function.
193.8. Threshold utility representations
Proposition 11 establishes that a choice function (on a ﬁnite choice space) can admit
a utility representation only if it satisﬁes Contraction, and thus relaxing this condition
allows our decision maker to behave inconsistently with the utility-maximization model.
The targeted generalization of this model posits the existence of functions f : X → <
and θ : A → < such that for each menu A we have
C(A) = [x ∈ A : f(x) = θ(A)]; (4)
i.e., such that the members of a choice set are those available alternatives that meet the
satisﬁcing criterion. In this case we shall say that the vector hf,θi provides a threshold
utility representation of the choice function, and we shall again call the representation
injective when the function f is one-to-one.
If the choice function admits a threshold utility representation hf,θi, then xPsy implies
that f(x) = θ(A) > f(y) for some menu A; and the following acyclicity condition is an
obvious consequence of this implication.
Condition 12 (Separation Acyclicity) (Ps)∗ ⊂ ¯ E.
On the other hand, if the condition holds then the relation (Ps)∗ is a partial order and
by the Embedding Theorem can be strengthened to a linear order Q. Assuming a ﬁnite
choice space (as in Section 2.8), this Q will be encodable in a one-to-one function f that
together with the mapping θ deﬁned by
θ(A) =

minf[C(A)] for A 6= ∅
0 for A = ∅ (5)
will provide a threshold utility representation for C.18
Proposition 22 A choice function on a ﬁnite choice space admits an injective threshold
utility representation if and only if it satisﬁes Separation Acyclicity.
The logical strength of Separation Acyclicity vis-` a-vis earlier conditions is measured by
the following result, which supplies the ﬁnal implication illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 23 Separation Acyclicity implies Base Acyclicity. Strong Expansion and
Base Acyclicity jointly imply Separation Acyclicity.
The last two propositions demonstrate that the conditions identiﬁed in Theorem 10
are suﬃcient for the choice function to admit a threshold utility representation hf,θi.
Strong Expansion is not necessary for the existence of such a representation, however,
and in order to derive the further constraint implied by this condition let us imagine
nonempty menus A ⊂ B such that θ(B) 5 maxf[A]. Choosing x ∈ A ⊂ B such that
f(x) = maxf[A] = θ(B), we have that x ∈ C(B) ∩ A. Strong Expansion then implies
that C(A) ⊂ C(B), and hence
θ(A) = minf[C(A)] = minf[C(B)] = θ(B). (6)
We can capture this additional property of our construction by calling a threshold















































































































































































































































































































21θ(B) > maxf[A] or θ(A) = θ(B). (See Figure 3.) And our ﬁnal result characterizes the
class of choice functions that admit representations with this feature.
Proposition 24 A choice function on a ﬁnite choice space admits an injective, dichoto-
mous threshold utility representation if and only if it satisﬁes Strong Expansion and Base
Acyclicity.
Note that when a nonempty menu A ⊂ B expands to include the alternatives in B\A,
we can be sure that the decision maker will derive beneﬁt from the added ﬂexibility only
when θ(B) > maxf[A] and hence
minf[C(B)] = θ(B) > maxf[A] = maxf[C(A)]; (7)
i.e., only on one side of the identiﬁed dichotomy. On the other side, when θ(A) = θ(B),
we cannot in general determine whether the provision of extra alternatives will lead to an
increase or a decrease in welfare, since when there are multiple alternatives that meet the
satisﬁcing criterion (i.e., multiple members of the choice set) our analysis does not tell us
which one the decision maker will select. This should be seen as an advantageous feature
of the theory, as it leaves room for aspects of the environment not modelled here to have
an impact on the decision maker’s well-being. For example, marketing activities such
as merchandizing and non-informative advertising can be viewed as means of inducing
the consumer to break in a particular direction the pseudo-indiﬀerence that results from
his inability to perceive his preferences among roughly comparable products; and these
aspects of the retail environment could be introduced into a market model populated by
the sort of cognitively-constrained agents whose behavior we have been studying.
A. PROOFS
Here we prove many of the results stated in Section 3.
Proposition 12: The nontrivial assertions follow from Propositions 13, 16, and 20.
Proposition 14: Let R be nested and C ⊂ R↑. Given x,y ∈ A, if x¯ Pl
Ay then there exists a
B ⊂ A such that x ∈ B and y ∈ C(B) ⊂ R↑(B). It follows that x¯ RBy and hence x¯ RAy since
R is nested. By contraposition, RA ⊂ Pl
A.
Proposition 16: Let R be nested and C ⊂ R ↑ . If R is not acyclic, then there exist
a menu B and alternatives x1,x2,...,xn ∈ B such that x1RBx2RB ···RBxnRBx1. Letting
A = [x1x2 ···xn] ⊂ B, it follows that x1RAx2RA ···RAxnRAx1 since R is nested. But then
C(A) ⊂ R↑(A) = ∅, contradicting Decisiveness.









k Ak) (the ﬁrst inclusion by Proposition 13, the second by the deﬁnition of Pl, and the third
by Local Lower Bound) and thus Weak Expansion holds. To show the converse, suppose that
Weak Expansion holds. For each x,y ∈ B such that x ∈ Pl↑(B) there exists a menu Ay ⊂ B
such that y ∈ Ay and x ∈ C(Ay). We then have x ∈
T
y∈B C(Ay) ⊂ C(
S
y∈B Ay) = C(B) (the
inclusion by Weak Expansion) and thus Local Lower Bound holds.
Lemma 4: If Pl is not a system of partial orders, then it cannot be transitive (being intrinsically
acyclic) and so there must exist alternatives x,y,z ∈ D such that xPl
DyPl
Dz and x¯ Pl
Dz. The
latter implies that there exists a menu A ⊂ D such that x ∈ A and z ∈ C(A), and letting
B = A∪[y] ⊂ D we have that xPl
ByPl
Bz since Pl is nested. By Proposition 13 we have C ⊂ Pl↑
18That C(A) ⊂ [x ∈ A : f(x) = θ(A)] is immediate. Conversely, for any A 6= ∅ there must exist some
y ∈ C(A) that achieves minf[C(A)]; and given x ∈ A such that f(x) = θ(A) = f(y) we then have that
y¯ Psx (since f encodes Q ⊃ (Ps)∗ ⊃ Ps) and hence that x ∈ C(A).
22and therefore y,z / ∈ C(B). But then C(B) ⊂ A ⊂ B and z ∈ C(A) \ C(B), and thus Adjunct
Expansion fails.
Now let R be a nested system of partial orders that generates C. If Adjunct Expansion
fails, then there must exist both menus C(B) ⊂ A ⊂ B and an alternative x ∈ C(A) \ C(B),
and since C = R↑ the latter implies both that x ∈ R↑(A) and that there exists a y1 ∈ B such
that y1RBx.
[Inductive step begins.] Let yk ∈ B be such that ykRBx. If yk ∈ A then ykRAx since R is
nested, contradicting x ∈ R↑(A). Alternatively, if yk ∈ B \ A then yk / ∈ C(B) = R↑(B) since
C(B) ⊂ A. But then there exists a yk+1 ∈ B such that yk+1RBykRBx, and therefore yk+1RBx
since R is transitive. [Inductive step ends.]
Using induction, we can construct a set D = [y1y2 ···] ⊂ B with the property that yk+1RByk
and hence (since R is nested) yk+1RDyk for each k = 1. But then C(D) = R ↑ (D) = ∅,
contradicting Decisiveness.
Lemma 5: If Pl is not a system of weak orders, then it cannot be negatively transitive (being




Dz. The former implies that there exist both a menu A ⊂ D such that x ∈ A and
y ∈ C(A) and a menu B ⊂ D such that y ∈ B and z ∈ C(B). Decisiveness ensures that
there exists an alternative w ∈ C(A ∪ B), and since both x ∈ A ∪ B ⊂ D and xPl
Dz we have
also z / ∈ C(A ∪ B). If either w ∈ B or y ∈ C(A ∪ B) then we have both C(A ∪ B) ∩ B 6= ∅
and z ∈ C(B) \ C(A ∪ B), and thus Strong Expansion fails. Alternatively, if both w / ∈ B and
y / ∈ C(A∪B) then we have both w ∈ C(A∪B)∩A and y ∈ C(A)\C(A∪B), and again Strong
Expansion fails.
Now let R be a nested system of weak orders that generates C. If Strong Expansion fails,
then there must exist both menus A ⊂ B and alternatives x ∈ C(B)∩A and y ∈ C(A)\C(B),
and since C = R ↑ we have y¯ RBx and x¯ RAy and thus x¯ RBy (since R is nested). Moreover,
there must also exist an alternative z ∈ B such that zRByR◦
Bx, and since R is cross transitive
it follows that zRBx and hence that x / ∈ C(B), contradicting x ∈ C(B).
Lemma 6: If Pl is not a system of linear orders, then it cannot be weakly connected (being
intrinsically acyclic) and so there must exist distinct alternatives x,y ∈ D such that x(Pl
D)◦y.
This implies that there exist both a menu A ⊂ D such that x ∈ A and y ∈ C(A) and a menu
B ⊂ D such that y ∈ B and x ∈ C(B). If x ∈ C([xy]), then we have x ∈ C(A) by Strong
Expansion and thus Univalence fails. Alternatively, if y ∈ C([xy]) then we have y ∈ C(B) by
Strong Expansion and again Univalence fails.
Now let R be a system of linear orders that generates C. If Univalence fails, then there
must exist distinct alternatives x,y ∈ A such that x,y ∈ C(A) = R↑(A). But this implies that
x(RA)◦y, contradicting the weak connectedness of R.
Proposition 20: Let R be nested and for each x,y ∈ X let C([xy]) = R↑([xy]). The latter






R. Conversely, since R is nested we have xRAy only if xR[xy]y and therefore only if xPby,




A∈A RA ⊂ Pb.
Proposition 21: Let Contraction hold. Given x,y ∈ X, if xPby then y / ∈ C([xy]) and for any
menu A ⊃ [xy] we have y / ∈ C(A) by Contraction, which is to say that xPgy. But then Pb ⊂ Pg
and (Pb)∗ ⊂ (Pg)∗ ⊂ ¯ E since Pg is acyclic, and thus Base Acyclicity holds.
Proposition 23: Let Separation Acyclicity hold. Since Pb ⊂ Ps by Proposition 1, we have
(Pb)∗ ⊂ (Ps)∗ ⊂ ¯ E by Separation Acyclicity, and thus Base Acyclicity holds.
Now let Strong Expansion and Base Acyclicity hold. Given x,y ∈ X, if xPsy then there
exists a menu A such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A\C(A). Since both [xy] ⊂ A and x ∈ C(A)∩[xy],
Strong Expansion implies that C([xy]) ⊂ C(A) and hence that y / ∈ C([xy]), which is to say
that xPby. But then Ps ⊂ Pb and (Ps)∗ ⊂ (Pb)∗ ⊂ ¯ E by Base Acyclicity, and thus Separation
Acyclicity holds.
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